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MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY TO THE ULTIMATE
CONSUIER
By A. J. Russn. t.*
The general rule in both this country and England is that
a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor is not liable to a third
party with whom he has no contract for defects m the article
constructed, manufactured, or sold. This broad rule finds its
authority in the famous case of Winterbottom v Wright.1
In this case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
entered into a contract with the Postmaster-General to keep the
carriages used in repair; that one Atkinson having notice of the
said contract entered into a contract with the Postmaster-Geft-
eral to deliver mail using the said mail coaches, that plaintiff,
an employee of Atkinson, with knowledge of these contracts was
injured when a wheel of one of the coaches broke; that the injury
was due to the defendant's failure to properly inspect. The
English Court demed recovery The two reasons advanced by
the judges were, first, that there was no duty owing from the
defendant to the plaintiff, and second, that it was bad policy to
allow recovery by any other than the contracting parties because
it would cause too many suits.
Lord Abiuger, C. B. in his opinion said "if the plaintiff can
sue, every passenger, or even every person passing along the
road, who is injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring
a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such con-
tracts as this to the parties who enter into them, the most absurd
and outrageous consequences, to which there can be no limit,
would ensue'
In his opinion in this case Alderson B. said "if we were to
hold that the plaintiff could sue m such a case, there Is no point
at which such action would stop. The only safe rule is to con-
fine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract
*Andrew J. Russell, A. B., Berea College, 1926; LL. B., Yale
University, 1928; Associated with Dean Robert M. Hutchins and Mr.
Donald Slessinger in the preparation of articles on the law of Evi-
dence and Psychology; Professor of Law, School of Law, University
of Louisville, since 1929.
10 M. & W. 109 (1842).
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if we go one'step beyond that, there is no reason why we should
not go fifty " Rolfe B. in his opinion said "the duty, therefore,
is shown to have arisen solely from the contract, and the fallacy
consists in the use of the word 'duty' If a duty to the Post-
master-General is meant, that is true, but if a duty to the plain-
tiff is intended (and in that sense the word is evidently used),
there is none."
The courts have extended this rule far beyond the facts of
this case. They now hold that any contractor, manufacturer, or
vendor is only liable to those with whom he has a contract, for
injuries caused due to some defect in the article constructed,
manufactured or sold. The user who is injured by such an article
cannot recover unless there is some privity of contract between
mn and the contractor, manufacturer, or vendor. To this rule
there are a number of exceptions. The first is that involved in
the manufacture and sale of food and drugs and announced in
Thomas v. Winchester 2 In this case the manufacturer put a
dandelion libel on a bottle containing belladonna. This bottle
through a retail druggist came to the hands of the plaintiff -who
suffered injury when she took the medicine. The court in allow-
mg a recovery; stated the above rule but said that this was an
exception to the general rule, because belladonna was a deadly
poison. The court said, "death or great bodily harm of some
person was the natural, and almost inevitable consequence of the
sale of belladonna by means of the false label. The
defendant's negligence put human life in eminent danger"
The court went on to say that the defendant's duty arose because
of the nature of his business. This exception to the general rule
has been adopted almost unanimously by the American courts.
The only question for the court to decide is whether or not the
particular article under consideration is a food or a drug, and
whether or not the manufacturer is negligent. Thus, the courts
have held the manufacturer liable in cases involving the sale of
laudanum labelled as tincture of rhubarb,3 wrong directions
were printed on a bottle of medicine,4 saltpeter sold for epsom
26 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
3,'orton v. Bewel , 106 Mass. 145 (1870),
4Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 857, 10 S. E. 118 (1889).
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salts,5 poison mineral oil.6 The courts have included food in the
rule of Thomas v Winchester One holding herself out as a
caterer is liable to one who eats unwholesome food, even though
the injured did not pay for the food." Foreign substance m ice
cream, coco cola, and various other beverages have been the
grounds for recovery s Articles of food such as flour,9 pork and
beans,10 and meat" have been the subject of liability where such
were not pure. In considering these food cases it is necessary
for the court to determine whether or not the particular article
rPorter v. Johnson, Jackson d- Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S. E. 190
(1901).
6 Meshbesher v. Chamelene Oil Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W
428 (1909).
'Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass. 411, 1 N. E. 154 (1885).
8 Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 43 R. I. (- ,) 144 Ati.
884, 63 A. S. R. 334 (1929). (Ice cream.)
Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 117 S. W. 80
(1914). (A cigar in a bottle of coca cola.)
Crzgger v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W 155
(1915), Jackson Coca Cola Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791
(1914). (Mice in bottle of coca cola.)
Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyjons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305
(1927), Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Ship, 41 Ga. App. 705, 154
S. E. 385 (1930) Perry v. Kelsford Coca Cola Bottling Co., 196 N. C.
690, 146 S. E. 805 (1929), Rozumailskz v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., 295 Penn. 114, 145 Atl. 700 (1929). (All cases involving glass
in bottles of coca cola.)
Chenault v. Huston Coca Cola Co., 151 Miss. 366, 118 So. 177 (1928),
Bufkin v. Grzsham, 157 Miss. 746, 128 So. 563 (1930), Coca Cola Bot-
tling Works v. McBride, 180 Ark. 193, 20 S. W (2d) 862 (1929). (Un-
known poisonous substance found in bottles of coca cola.)
Ranwatter v. Hattisburg Coca Cola Co., 131 Miss. 315, 94 So. 444
(1925). (Flies in orange crush.)
Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S. . 152 (1905).
(Glass in soda water.). Birmingham Chero Cola Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala.
678, 89 So. 64 (1921). (Foreign substance in a bottled drink.)
Nook v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburg, Pa.,
156 Atl. 537 (1931), Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Bennett, 184 Ark. 329,
42 S. W (2d) 213 (1931). (Worms in bottles of coca cola.)
Culbertson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 157 S. C. 352, 154 S. E. 424
(1930). (Insects in a bottle of coca cola.)
Atlanta Coca Cola Co. v. Holbrook, 40 Ga. App. 269, 149 S. E. 316
(1929). (A bottle cap in a bottle of coca cola.)
Dothan Chero Cola Bottling Works v. Weeks, .16 Ala. App. 639, 80
So. 734 (1918), and Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 70 Ga. 817, 154
S. E. 243 (1930), Atlanta Coca Cola Co. v. Dean, 43 Ga. App. 682, 160
S. E. 105 (1931).
'Hertzler v. Manshun, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W 155 (1924).
10 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Ia. 775, 176 N. W 382 (1920).
Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S. '%V 40 (1919), Tom-
linson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 Atl. 348, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
923 (1907), Cantans v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931, L. R. A.
1917 B, 1272 (1915), Haley v. Swift & Co., 152 Wis. 570, 140 N. W 292
(1913), Ketterer v. Armour d Co., 200 Fed. 322 (1912), Ietterer v.
Armour & Co., 247 Fed. 921 (1917).
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under consideration is an article of food. This question does not
give much difficulty It was decided, however, that since chewing
tobacco was not a food the plaintiff could not recover for injuries
occasioned by biting a large bug inbedded in a plug of tobacco. 12
The Mlississippi Court held that chewing tobacco was "intrinsic-
ally dangerous" since -t was to be taken into the mouth and
chewed, and therefore recovery allowed.' 3  Where a manufac-
turer failed to properly neutralize the poisonous substance used
in the manufacture of soap and a bar containing poison was sold
by a retailer to the plaintiff who was injured by its use and
recovered damages. 14 But where injury was caused by a needle
hidden in a cake of soap recovery was demed.15 It seems hard
to see any basis for distinction between the two cases, and cer-
tainly the first case represents the sounder view
Various kinds of explosives not properly labelled or im-
properly manufactured form the ground for another line of
decisions in which recovery has been allowed. Thus the court
allowed recovery when, gasoline, 16 naphtha,' or lugher explo-
sive oil 19 was sold as kerosene, and where "champagne cider"
was sold without notice of its explosive qualities and caused
Injury 20 Other injuries for which recovery has been allowed
were caused by explosions of stan, 21 stove, polish,22 disinfect-
ant 23 fluid used in dry cleaning,2 4 gasoline shipped in defective
drum,2 5 scraps of film,26 and proxoloid comb. 27
1ILngget-Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S. W
1009, L. R. A. 1916 A, 940, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 179 (1915).
"'Pillars v. R. J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss, 490, 78 So. 365
(1918).
14Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem, 151 S. W 576 (Tex. 1912).
25Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W 157 (1909).
"Kentuckiy Independent Oil Co. v. Schmitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271
S. W. 570 (1925).
21 Wellington v. Downer Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870).
"9Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Ore. 511, 106 Pac. 337 (1910).
"VWetzer v. Holzman, 33 Wash. 87, 77 Pac. 797, 99 Am. St. Rep.
932 (1903).21 Thornhill v. Carpenter, 220 Mass. 593, 108 N. E. 474 (1914).
Clements v. Crosby and Co., 148 Mich. 293, 111 N. W 745, 10
L. R. A. (N. S.) 585, Ann. Cas. 265 (1907).
W T. Rawleigh Co. v. Schoultz, 56 Fed. (2nd) 148.
"La. Oil Refinzng Co. v. Reed (1930), 38 Fed. (2nd) 159.
2 Moore v. Jefferson Distilling and Denaturtng Co., 12 La. App. 405,
123 So. 384 (1929).
2 Gutnen v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 167 N. E. 235 -(Mass.
1929).
2"Farey v. Edward F Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N. E. 639
(1930).
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Explosions of bottles caused either by a defect in the bottle
or by overcharging the substance, have caused injuries for
which recovery was granted.28 Closely related to these cases are
cases involving injuries caused by the explosion of a coffee urn,29
and boiler tubes,3 0 in which recovery was allowed.
Another important line of decisions are those involving de-
fects in various kinds of machinery As to whether or not
recovery will be allowed in these cases depends upon the kind of
machinery and the nature of the defect involved. In Huset v.
J I. Case Threshing Machmne Co.-" one of the leading cases on
this phase of the subject, the court said. " one who
sells or delivers an article which is imminently dangerous to life
or limb to another without notice of its qualities is liable to
another person who suffers an injury therefrom which might
have been reasonably anticipated, whether there was any con-
tractual relations between the parties or not." In this case the
defendant sold to plaintiff's employer a threshing machine.
There was a large cylinder with a covering on which employees
had to walk in the course of their duty This covering collapsed
under the plaintiff causing him to come in contact with the cylin-
der and inflicting serious injury It was alleged that the col-
.lapse was caused by the defective construction of the covering.
The court held that the above exception to the general rule gov-
erned the case and allowed recovery Either following this rule
or governed by it, the courts have allowed recovery in a large
group of miscellaneous cases.3 2
2 Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky, 218, 282 S. W 778
(1926) (a coca cola bottle) Stolle v. Anheuser Busch, 307 Mo. 520,
271 S. W. 497 (1925) (a bottle of budweiser). See notes on this phase
of the subject in 8 A. L. R. 500 and 39 A. L. R. 1006, Smith. v. Peerless
Glass Co., 251 N. Y. S. 708, 233 App. Div. 252 (1931). (Pop bottle.) Re-
covery was denied in Stone v. Van Nay Ry. News Co., et. al., 153 Ky.
240, 154 S. W. 1090 (1913). (A pop bottle exploded putting out the
plaintiff's eye. The court held that it was not inherently dangerous.)
"Statler v. A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 IN. Y. 478, 89 N, E. 1063; (1909).
"Marsh Wood Products Co. V. Babcook & Wiloxz Co., 207 Wis. 209,
240 N. W 392 (1932).
"120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237, 61 L. R. A. 303 (1903).
"Krohn v. Owens Co., 125 Minn. 33, 145 1. W. 626 (1914) (a
threshing machine. Very similar to the Huset case). Kuelling v.
Rodericl Lean Manufacturng Co., 183 N. Y. 79, 75 N. E. 1098 (1905)
(a defective tongue in a farm roller). Olds Motor Co. v. Shaffer, 145
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There is still another group of cases in which recovery is
allowed. Sandborn, J. in Huset v J 7. Case Threshvng Machtne
0o.33 states the rule as follows: "The second exception is that
an owner's act of negligence which causes injury to one -who is
invited by hn to use his defective appliance upon the owner's
premises may form the basis of an action against the owner."
The premises do not need to be inherently dangerous to allow
recovery here. As far as the writer has been able to discover,
the first distinction between the manufactured product being on
or off of the manufacturer's premises was made in Conghtry v
Globe Woole C0o. 34 In this case the injury was caused by the
collapse of a scaffold built by the defendant on his premises and
being used by the injured's employer who was a construction
contractor. The court allowing the injured employee recovery
made this distinction in harmonizing the case with Winterbottom
v Wright. This rule has been followed in many cases most of
Ky. 616, 140 S. W. 1047, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 689, 37 L. R. A. (N. 4.) 560
(1911) (a rumble seat insecurely fastened to the body of the car).
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050,
L. R. A. 1916 F, 669, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 440 (1916). (A defective auto-
mobile wheel). Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co., 261 Fed. 878, 8 A. L. R.
1023 (1919). (A defective wheel on an automobile.)
Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 I1. 78, 164 N. B. 162, 60
A. L. R. 353 (1928). (A defective air shaft buil in a heating system.)
Dahms v. General Electrzo Co., 214 Calif. 733, 7 Pac. (2d) 1013
(1932). (A negligently repaired elevator.)
Payton's Admr v. Childer's Elevator Co., et al., 228 Ky. 44, 14 S. W
(2d) 208 (1929). (A crane with which to lift ice negligently con-
structed')
Elder v. Algoma Foundry and Machine Co., 200 Wis. 471, 227 N. W
944 (1929). (Defectively made sawing machine.)
Employer's LIability Assur Co. v. Columbus, 13 Fed. (2d) 128
(1926) (a defective chain); Woodward v. Miller, 119 Ga. 618, 46 S. F.
847, 100 Am.,St. Rep. 188, 64 L. R. A. 932 (1903) (a defective spindle
In the wheel of a buggy), Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., 101 N. J. 385, 128
Atl. 242 (1925) (a defective pulley on a tractor), Devlin v. Smith, 89
N. Y. 470 (1882) (a negligently constructed painter's scaffold),
Schubert v. Clark, 49 Minn. 331. 51 N. W 1103, 15 L. R. A. 818 (1892)
(a defectively constructed step ladder, the defect being concealed by
paint), Leuns v. Terry, 11 Calif. 39, 43 Pac. 398, 3l, L. R. A. 220, 52
Am. St. Rep. 146 (1896) (a defectively constructed folding bed),
Laughrmdge v. Levy, 2 Mes. & W 519, 4 Mes. & W 337 (1857) (a de-
fectively manufactured gun), Ross v. Dunstall, 63 Can. S. C. 393, 63
D. L. R. 63 (1921) (a defective gun), Herman v. Markham Air Rifle
Co,. 258 Fed. 475 (1918) (a loaded air rifle). See also Graham v. John
B. Watts 4 Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S. W. (2d) 859 (alfalfa seed sold as
sweet clover).
3 Supra note 31.
- 56 N. Y. 124, 15 Am. St. Rep. 387 (1874).
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which involve scaffolds and structures of that kind on the
defendant's prennses.-
Briefly stated, recovery has been allowed in most cases where
food, drugs, and beverages were involved, where one is exposed
to high explosives, where machinery or other instruments that
can be classified as "inherently dangerous" are in question, and
in cases where one is invited on the premises of another to use a
defective appliance.
This leaves a large number of cases where the manufacturer
is alleged to have been negligent, and the ultimate consumer is
injured but recovery denied because there was no privity of
contracts.
It is interesting .to note that while there is recovery for
injury suffered because of poison in food for human consump-
tion, this doctrine is not extended to include animal foods. Thus
where poison hay and feed were sold and eaten by the plaintiff's
horses which died, recovery was demed."3 6 This same conclusion
was reached in a case where chickens had died from eating a
poisonous elncken feed.37
Other cases in which recovery has been denied are numerous
and cover the largest variety of cases. The courts have denied
recovery against the manufacturer for one reason or another for
injuries caused by the following articles, a needle imbedded in
a cake of soap, 38 a defective storage battery,39 glass in a bottle
SHeaven v. Pender, L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883) (staging neces-
sary to paint a vessel), Mowbray v. Merryweather, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 640
(1885) (a defective chain furnished by defendant to unload his vessel),
Marney v. Scott, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 986 (1899) (a defective ladder on a
vessel), Mulchey v. Methodist Religious Society, 125 Mass. 487 (1878)
(a defectively constructed scaffolding to paint the interior of church),
Toomy v. Donovan, 158 Mass. 232, 33 N. E. 396 (1893) (defective ma-
chinery), Bright v. Barnett & Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60 N. W. 418, 26
L. R. A. 524 (1894) (defective staging in building).
' Pease & Dwyer Co. v. Somers Planting Co., 130 Miss. 147, 93 So.
673 (1922) (Hay), Royal Feed and, Milling Co. v. Thorn, 142 Miss. 92,
107 So. 282 (1926) (Feed).
Tompkins v. Quaker Oats Co., 239 Mass. 147, 131 N. E. 456 (1921).
But sfe Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co., 44 S. Dak. 421, 184 N. W
252 (1921), holding that an allegation that the defendant negligently
manufactured serum for vaccination of hogs which poisoned and killed
the hogs stated a cause of action.
'sHasbrouck v. Armour Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W 157 (1909).
(No privity of contract.)
"Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N. Y. 73, 161 N. E.
423 (1928). (Suit was based on breach of warranty.)
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of milk,4 0 flies in ;a bottle of beverage,41 a nail in a piece d:
cake42 a pin in a piece of bread,4 3 a nail in a piece of bread,4 4
spoiled cooked tongue, 45 mouse in coco cola,4 6 explosion of a
boiler sold to a third party,47 defective iron furnished by the
defendant for the construction of a building,48 a negligently
constructed bridge,49 negligently remodeled building,50 defec-
tively built sewage system,51 negligently constructed building,52
a defective fly wheel, 53 explosion of a defective cylinder in a
threshing machine,5 4 poor grade of lubricating oil causing a glass
tube to explode, 55 sulphide of antimony labelled as black oxide
manganese, 56 explosion of a bottle of pop,5 7 cement that would
40 Carlson v. Turner Centre System, 263 Mass. 339, 161 N. E. 245
(1928). (Suit was on a breach of warranty.)
41Grafico Bottling Co. v. Enns, 140 Miss. 502, 106 So. 97 (1925).
(Suit was on breach of warranty.)
42Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923).(Suit on breach of warranty.)
43Pe~letier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925). (Suit on
breach of warranty.)
" ewhall v. Ward Ba~king Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625 (1922).(Judgment was reversed because the lower court allowed the plaintiff
to recover on the ground of fraud and deceit. The court held that
there was no fraud.)
15Nelson v. Armour Packzng Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S. W 288 (1905).(Suit on breach of warranty.)
"Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W
155 (1915). (Suit on breach of warranty.)4 Losee v. Chute, 51 N. Y. 494 (1873). (The boiler had been ac-
cepted, inspected, and used by the purchaser for a number of years.)
"'Ford v. Sturgss, 14 Fed. (2d) 253 (1926). (No privity. The build-
ing had been accepted.)
4'Traws v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N. E. 1 (1918).(Act of accepting the bridge broke the chain of causation.)
"Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Indiana 255, 44 N. E. 457 (1896). (No
duty.)5 First Presbyterian Church v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561, 30 Atl. 279
(1894). (No duty.)
Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (1891). (The building
had been accepted.)
'3Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351 (1870). (The defect was pointed
out to the purchaser.)
" Hezzer v. Kingsland & Douglas Mfg. Co., 110 Mo. 605, 19 S. W
630, 15 L. R. A. 821 (1892).
13Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S. W 345, 11 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 238 (1907). (No privity.)
m Davidson v. Nichols, 11 Allen 514 (Mass., 1866). (The injury re-
sulted from an explosion which was caused by mixing this substance
with chlorate of potassia. The court held: that the substance was not
in itself dangerous but only so when mixed with potassia.)
5 Stone v. Van Noy By. News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 154 S. W 1092(1913). (Article not intrinsically dangerous nor was it shown that
the defendant knew of the defective condition of the bottle.)
K. L.-3
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not become firm, 50 sharp points of metal in a mattress,59 fabric
cement causing fabric to weaken,60 a nail in a shoe,0 1 a defective
side saddle,62 a carriage, 3 ball and socket in a machine, 6" a
hook,65 defective emery wheel, 66 a leaky lamp,67 defective
wheels, 68 a defective crane
.
69 shelves in a store falling and injur-
ing a customer,70 a negligently hung chandelier 71 a defective
valve in an oil car,72 a defective rope on a derrick, 73 glass m a
powdered substance known as Muresco used for interior decorat-
ing,74 explosion of a water boiler,75 the sight of a bug in a loaf
of bread.76 a needle lodged in the side of a box containing can-
18Abercrumbze v. Urnon Portland Cement Co., 35 Idaho 231, 205
Pac. 1118 (1922). (No privity.)
Jarornee v. C. 0. Hasselbarth, Inc., 223 App. Div. 182, 228 N. Y. S.
302 (1928). (No privity. Not such an instrument as to be reasonably
certain to imperil human life.)
10Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131
N. E. 454 (1921). (No privity.)
"Kerwrn v. Chsppewa Shoe Mfg. Co. (1916), 163 Wis. 428, 157
N. W 1101 (1916). (No privity. Not inherently dangerous.)
61 Bragdon v. Perkmns-Campbell Co., 87 Fed. 109 (1896). (No fraud
and deceit. Not inherently dangerous.)
0 Bucket v. Studebaker Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S. W 421 (1912).
(No privity. Not inherently dangerous.)
'"endIrk v. Louisville Elevator Co., 122 Ky. 675, 92 S. W. 608, 5
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1103 (1906). (Not inherently dangerous.)
McCaffrey v. Massberg & Granville Mfg. Co., 23 R. I. 381, 50 At.
651 (1901). (Not inherently dangerous. No privity.)
6Lebourdias v. Verified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N. E. 482
(1907). (Not inherently dangerous. Would subject one to too many
slits.)
"'Longmeic v. Holiday, 6 Exch. 761 (1351). (No privity of con-
tracts. The lamp was sold to the injured's husband.)
' J I. Case- Plow Works v. Niles & S. Co., 90 Wis. 590, 63 N. W
1013 (1895). (Action based on breach of warranty.)
'Blakemore v. Bristol & E. R. Co., 8 El. & BI. 1036 (1858). (No
duty owed by defendant to the plaintiff.)
"Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393, 20 Am. Rep. 767 (1875).
(No duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.)
71 Collins v. Selden, L. R. 3 0. P. 495 (1868). (No duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff.)
C2Goodlander Mills Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Fed. 400, 11 C. C. A.
253, 27 L. R. A. 583 (1894). (No duty owed from the defendant to the
plaintiff.)
"Burke v. DeCastro & D. Sugar Refining Co., 11 Hun. 354 (1877).
(No privity.)
'1 Schfranek v. Benjammn Moore & Co., 54 F (2d) 76 (1931). (Plain-
tiff cut his finger on the glass while stirring the mixture. The court
held that the injury was too remote.)
SGiberti v. James Barrett Mfg. Co., 266 Mass. 70, 165 N. E. 19
(1929). (No privity. Not inherently dangerous.)
18 Legac v. Vietmeyer Bros., 7 N. J. Misc. R. 685, 147 At. 110 (1929).
(It was seeing the bug that caused the illness and not eating it and
the injury was not the proximate consequence of the wrong.)
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ned goods injuring the plaintiffs hand as he opened it,77 a cock-
roach in a loaf of bread 78 fly in a bottle of coca cola,7 9 a danger-
ously built tractor,80 a can of lime which exploded when being
opened,s roman candles, 82 a brazing lamp8 3 defective hoisting
ropa to an elevator.84
These are by no means all of the cases which have been liti-
gated. Merely to give the citation to all such cases would. be too
burdensome.8 5 For the purpose of this article, the writer. desired
only to give a representative group of cases in which recovery
has been both allowed and denied.
A survey of these decisions will show that there is no urn-
formity in the holdings. In a given case the major part of the
decision is devoted to deciding the nature of the article. Is it
"inherently" or "imminently" dangerous to human life, health
or limb? Impure food and drugs fall within this description.
But when we start dealing with the miscellaneous group of arti-
cles each case must be handled as a unit-the main question being
is it "inherently" or "imminently," or "intrinsically" danger-
ous to human life or limb. There is no test, no gauge, for decid-
ing this question. Naturally the courts in different jurisdictions
have reached all conclusions on the largest variety of articles.
Such is the case. There is no consistency in the holdings. Thus,
we see that while some courts follow Winterbottom v Wrnght
and hold that the purchaser of a buggy cannot recover for in-
"Speigel v. Libby, McTeill & Libby, 244 N. Y. S. 654, 137 Misc. Rep.
698 (1930). (Injury too remote.)
1"1Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 Fed. (2d) 141 (1929). (Even
though the plaintiff bit into the insect the court held that there was
no evidence of negligence.)
"'Reese v. Durham Coca Cola Bottling Co., 197 N. C. 661, 150 S. E.
190 (1929). (Failed to prove that the fly was in the bottle).
O*Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 954 (1926).
(Manual of complete instructions was given out with the tractor which
plaintiff did not follow.)
"Kuszck v. Thorndike d Hix, 224 Mass. 413, 112 N. E. 1025 (1916).
(The lime was only packed and not manufactured by the defendant.
The court held that there was no evidence that he knew it was in-
herently dangerous.)
"'St. Louis Fireworks Co. v. Wilson, 5 Tenn. C, C. A. 388 (1915).
(No privity.)
8Blacker v. Lake d Blliott, 106 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 533 (1912). (No
privity.)
"Barrett v. Singer Mfg. Co., 1 Sweeney 545 (N. Y.). (No privity.)
1 For further cases on the general rule or any of the exceptions to
It, see annotations in 17 A. L. R. 672, 39 A. L. R. 992, 63 A. L. R. 340.
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juries sustained because of a defect m construction,8 6 another
court on the same facts has reached the opposite conclusion and
allowed recovery on the ground that there was a false represen-
tation in selling the defective buggy 87 The court did not base
the action on fraud and deceit, but said it was very similar to an
action for deceit. A threshing machine is an inherently danger-
ous machine when we are considering a defective covering over
a cylinder,8 8 but is not so when we are considering a defective
cylinder which diew into pieces causing the death of employee.8 9
A coffee urn90 is an inherently dangerous instrument, but a hot
water tank,91 is not. A defectively built,92 or repaired9 3 eleva-
tor is inherently dangerous, but a defectively constructed bridge
by which people must cross a stream is not.94 A defective chain
which must sustain great weight is inherently dangerous.9 5 but
a hook which is to hold a large drop press is not.9 6 A defective
rope on a derrick is not inherently dangerous,9 s but a defectively
constructed crane or derrick is.°9 While a defective way of
fastening a hoisting rope to an elevator makes the elevator in-
herently dangerous,10 0 the rope itself, if defective, does not.1 01
A needle imbedded in a cake of soap is not inminently danger-
ous,i °2 but if the soap contains the wrong composition of a
poisonous substance it is.1o3 A defective boiler tube 0 4 comes in
the exception but if the entire boiler is negligently constructed
the general rule governs.OS Chewing tobacco containing a fore-
ign substance is not a food and therefore no recovery in Ten-
nessee,ioo but it is inherently dangerous and there may be a
Supra note 63.
Woodward v. Miller, supra note 32.
' Supra note 33.
Supra note 54.
10 Supra note 29.
91 Supra note 75.
"Berg & Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924).
Dahms v. General Elevator Co., supra note 32.
Supra note 49.
Employer's Lzability Assur Co. v. Columbus, supra note 32.
Supra note 65.
Supra note 73.
Payton, Admr v. Childer's Eleetrt Co., supra note 32.
' Supra note 92.
:11 Supra note 84.
30 Supra note 38.
20 Supra note 14.
20 Supra note 30.
20 Supra note 47.
'0 Supra note 12,
MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY TO THE ULTIMATE CONSUMER 399
recovery In Mississippl. 10 7  A charged pop bottle which explodes
is both inherently dangerous10 8 and not so' 0 9 in the same state.
It is plain from the eases above referred to that the courts
are floundering about with the phrase "inherently dangerous"
There seems to be no consistent or definite idea as to what.is
meant by it. The courts have been spending their time trying
to decide whether or not an article is "imminently dangerous"
where the real question should be "who was at fault."
We have seen that when the general rule was first an-
nounced, there were two reasons advanced to support it. The
rule was deemed necessary by the court to protect the manufac-
turer from numerous suits and because there was no duty owing
from the defendant to the plaintiff. Let us now look into these
reasons and see if they have merit.
As to the charge that to allow recovery in such cases would
subject the manufacturer to too many suits it is submitted that
there is no merit in this contention. The ordinary rules of
"proximate cause" and "foreseeability of harm" are adequate
to protect one from innumerable suits. The ability of a reason-
able and prudent man to foresee harm is the test of determining
liability 110 All the authorities reach this conclusion. The only
conflict is the analysis by which the conclusion is reached. One
line of authorities treat the question of foreseeability of harm
as part of the proof of negligence. 111  They hold that
there is no negligence unless the actor could under the
circumstances, have foreseen that harm to thus person
would naturally result from his act. The other authorities
say that foreseeability of harm is an essential element to
recovery but that the ability of the prudent man in the position
of the actor to foresee harm is the test of whether or not the act
201 Supra note 13.
'1 Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, supra note 28.
I' Supra note 57.
"
0 Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence
(Bowen Merrill Co., 1901), p. 54 and 60 Francis H. Bohlen, Studies in
ther Law of Torts (Bobbs Merrill Co., 1926), p. 1. Thomas M. Cooley,
A. Treatise on the Law of Torts (Callaghan and Co., Throckmorton's
Ed.), p. 60. Are Negligence and Proximate Cause Determined by the
Same Test?-Texas Decision, Analyzed, Leon Green, 1 Tex. L. R. 243(1922), Milwaukee, etc., By. Co. v. Kellogg, 44 U. S. 469 (1876).
1n Bohlen op. cit., p. 15, Cooley op. cit., p. 57 et seq. Palsgraff v.
Long Island, R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
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was the proximate cause of the injury 112 For the purposes of
this article the author does not'care to discuss the relative merits
of the two theories. It is immaterial in so far as we are here
concerned whether the ability to foresee harm is an element m
proving negligence, or the test of showing proxmate cause. The
important point is that in order to hold one liable for his act it
must be shown that he could have foreseen injury to this person.
Professor Bohlen says, "he, the wrongdoer, owes a duty of care
to those only whom the normal man should foresee that Ins
lack of care might injure." 113 Again this same author says
"Even though the act be wrongful as a misdemeanor against the
commonwealth, or as threatening injmry to a tird party, it is
not negligent as to the plaintiff unless it could and should have
been foreseen as likely to injure the plaintiff himself. "114 Thomp-
son says "The general test as to whether negligence is the proxi-
mate cause of an accident is therefore said to be whether it is
such that a person of ordinary intelligence should have foreseen
that an accident was liable to be produced thereby "115 Under
either theory the liability of the wrongdoer is limited to injuries
caused by his act which a man of reasonable prudence could and
should have foreseen. This is true whether we make forseeability
essential to the proof of negligence or make it the test of proxi-
mate cause. That this doctrine protects the manufacturer from
innumerable suits, there can be no doubt. It allows recovery
only to those to whom injury could have been foreseen by a
prudent man. Cases of manufacturers and vendors would be
limited to those persons who would naturally and ordinarily fall
victim to the wrong. This would certainly give to the wrong-
doer much more protection than was announced m Winterbotton
v. Wrigtt by Lord Abinger C. B. who said. "there is no privity
of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue,
Overy passenger, or even every person passing along the road
who was injured by the upsetting of the coach might bring a
similar action." This statement certainly is not accurate. As we
have seen the wrongdoer's act might have constituted negligence
"1
2 Thompson op. cit., p. 60, quoting from Milwaukee, etc., Byr. Oo.
v. Kellogg, supra note 110, and citing other authorities.
ul Bohlen op. cit., p. 6.
"
4 Bohlen op. cit., p. 15.
Thompson op. cit., p. 60.
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in so far as the driver of the coach is concerned but not be negli-
gent towards a pedestrian on the highway, or, as others would
say it mght not be the proxmnate cause of the injury to the
pedestrian. In this case Alderson B. said "The only safe rule
is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the con-
tract. if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we
should not go fifty" But there is a very definite reason why
a court could go one step beyond this rule and still not go fifty
The court apparently failed to give any consideration to the
question of proximate cause and forseeability of harm. The
plaintiff could be liable for whatever injury a reasonable and
prudent man could have foreseen and still not be liable to the
entire world.
The second reason given by the court to justify the con-
clusion in Winterbottom v Wright was that the defendant owed
no duty to the plaintiff. It is true that there was no contractual
duty here. It is also true, in this particular case, that the duty
was alleged to exist because of the contract between the defend-
ant and the Postmaster-General. This particular case might be
justified on the ground that the plaintiff's allegation was so
specific on this point that it prevented hin from proving or rely-
ing on any common law duty that might exist. The particular
form of the petition in that case is quite often overlooked. There
is also the proposition that in Winterbottom v. Wright the wrong
consisted of failing to act while in most of the cases here under
consideration the wrong consists of some active misconduct. We
say in negligence cases that in order to hold the defendant liable
for an alleged wrongful act it must be shown that the defendant
has been guilty of some breach of duty owing from the defendant
to the plaintiff.i6 What do we mean by "duty" as used in
these cases ? Of course, this duty may arise out of a contract.
It may also exist because of the relation of the parties. What
must that relationship be 9
Brett, M. R. in Heaven v Penderi 7 stated this duty to be as
follows: "Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in
such a position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not
21 Cooley op. cit., p. 615.
-' Supra note 35.
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use ordinary care and sldll in his own conduct with regard to
those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the per-
son or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care
and skill to avoid such danger"
Mr. Ju~tice Cardozo says "The orbit of the danger as dis-
closed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the
ciuty "11s Again in the same case he says "The risk reason-
ably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed"
Professor Bohlen says "There exists a general duty upon
every man to refrain from acts, whether wilful or careless, prob-
ably injurious to others who should be expected to be within
reach of their effects.""( This brings us right back to the ques-
tion of foreseeability of harm. There can be no negligence unless
there is a breach of duty 120 A reasonable person, when in a
position to foresee that a contemplated act will cause harm to an
individual, is under a duty to that individual to refrain from
doing the act. In fact, and certainly in tort cases, most duties
arise because of the relation of the parties and not by contract.
The question to be decided in these cases should be not whether
or not the article is "inherently dangerous" The manufacturer
has made a product, there is admittedly a defect in it, the defect
could have been discovered by a reasonable exanunation, it is
sold and through the jobber and retailer comes to the hands of
the user who is injured because of the defect. With the facts
admitted the next important question is when the manufacturer
wrongfully left the defect in the article could and should an
ordinary and prudent man placed in his position have foreseen
that injury would result to the purchaser and user as a probable
consequence of his act Q The nature of the article, its location,
and the purpose for which it is to be used are items that should
be considered in answering the question. No one would contend
that a pm in a ;cake of soap1 21 would be as likely to result in
harm as a deadly poison labelled as -a mild medicine. 12 2 The
mislabelled medicine is almost certain to result in serious injury,
8 Cardozo J. in Palsgroff v. Long Island R. Co., supra note 111.
ng Bohlen op. cit., p. 61.
2'Bohlen op. cit., p. 7, quoting from Smith v. R. R. Co., L. R. 6
C. P., 14, 21 (1870), Palsgroff v. Long Island1R., supra note 111, Thomp-
son op. cit., p. 4.
= Supra note 15.
11Supra note 2.
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-while it is possible that the pin will be discovered before it causes
harm. But simply because it is possible to discover the defect
and avoid harm is no reason for denying recovery The question
is not whether one is more likely to cause harm than the other.
The question in either case is whether or not such harm could
have been foreseen as a natural and probable result of the act,
there exists a duty to use care.
Diseased meat 2s is almost certain to cause harm to someone,
so is a poisonous bug securely packed away in a plug of chewing
tobacco.124 It cannot be said that there is a duty to use care in
the case of the meat and not in the case 6f the tobacco. If there
is a duty in the one case there is duty in the other.
This duty arises in the case of food sold for human consump-
tion but not if it is sold for animal consumption. 12 5 It is sub-
mitted that the duty exists in both cases. It is just as easy to
foresee injury to a horse eating poison hay as it is to foresee
harm to a man eating poison meat. Harm is just as likely in one
case as the other. If any difference it is more likely in the case
of the horse because of man's ability to discover impurities.
Even in cases where damages are inevitable the courts have
either denied recovery or sought other grounds on which to base
it.i12 In Graham v John R. Waits and Son,1 27 the defendant,
a packer, and wholesaler of seed, by mistake put sweet clover
seed in a sack labelled alfalfa. The seeds were sold to a retailer,
who in turn sold them to the plaintiff, who sowed them to his
injury It was shown that the two types of seeds are so similar
that it would take an expert in seeds to tell them apart. Sweet
clover seed not being inherently dangerous, the counsel for the
plaintiff based the action on fraud and deceit The court al-
lowed recovery on this ground saying that this case involved
something more than "mere negligence" The result reached in
the case was the proper one. But the case was based on the
wrong ground. It should have been based on negligence. After
223 See cases cited supra note 11.
2 Supra note 12.
Supra note- 36.
See Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., Olds Motor co. v.
Shaffer; and Schubert v. Clark, all cited supra note 32 basing recovery
,on implied knowledge of the manufacturer of the defect. See also
Woodward v. Miller, and Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, cited supra
mote 32 basing recovery on fraud and deceit.
221 Supra note 32.
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a careful reading of the case I am not so sure but that the plain-
tiff would have recovered had he based his action on negligence.
Admitting a duty to use care is owed from the manufac-
turer to the ultimate consumer, can these cases be justified on
the ground of public policy? Is the rule sound from an econo-
mic standpoint This question has already been partially
ansivered.
We have seen that to recover against any defendant the
plaintiff must show the defendant did not conduct himself as an
ordinary and prudent man would have under the circumstances,
that his conduct constituted a violation of a duty to plaintiff-
that is that a reasonable man in the position of the defendant
could have foreseen harm to the plaintiff, and that the act was
the proximate and not the remote cause of the injury If we
spread that much protection around one who is admittedly at
fault, does public policy demand more? We are protecting him
beyond the realm of forseeability of harm. We are not holding
him. for results that he could not contemplate. But when we
have done this have we not gone far enough? Are we not put-
ting too much of a preium on carelessness '
This old general rule is further condemned today by the
ordinary business practices of this country The manufacturer
makes the product. He then turns it over to the jobber or
wholesaler who in turn passes it on to the retailer who sells it to
the user. The user is the person who suffers the injury He
rarely ever buys from the manufacturer. Then a contract be-
tween the manufacturer and the user is the rarest exception.
This results in a situation in which the injured person cannot
recover damages. On the other hand, the wholesaler or jobber,
or in some cases the retailer, is the party who has the contract
with the manufacturer. But he is rarely ever injured. Ile
could recover damages if he suffered injury, but he suffers none.
It is possible then for the one who never gets injured to recover
if he should get injured, but not possible to grant recovery to the
one who always suffers injury This is neither good law, nor
good sense.
The manufacturer gets paid well for his product. In many
cases it is nationally advertised. The manufacturer's stamp
sells the product. The user, in many cases cares not from whom
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he purchases. His concern is in who made the article. The
manufacturer is the only one who has an opportunity to ade-
quately inspect. In most cases he is the only one who is quali-
fied to inspect. He is the only one from whom an inspection
is expected. If there is a duty on the part of another to in-
spect and he does so negligently, that brings up the question of
intervening cause which the writer does not care to discuss here.
But in the great majority of cases it does not come up at all.
In cases where the manufacturer has knowledge of the defect
he is liable to the user regardless of 'contract. The soundness of
this rule cannot be doubted. The courts have gone even further
than this and have implied knowledge on the part of the manu-
facturer.128 In Olds Motor Works v Shaffer,129 the court said.
"We think the evidence that the construction of the rear seat was
unsafe and dangerous was sufficient to bring notice of the defect
home to the maker." It is just as reasonable to presume notice in
one case as another. The only material consideration here is
that in some cases because of paint used or because of the parti-
cular way in which two pieces of material are put together it
might be impossible for the user to discover the defect. It is
submitted that this doctrine of presuming knowledge is just an-
other way to avoid a harsh and unjust rule of law. This rule
of limiting recovery to the party to the contract is purely arbi-
trary It is based neither on logic, justice, nor public policy
Our present system of carrying on business makes the rule still
more unfair. -
CONCLUSION
In Winterbottom v. Wr ght the English court was confronted
with a petition alleging a failure oi the part of the defendant
to repair a carriage, that defendant was bound by contract to
repair the carriage, and that his failure constituted a breach of
duty to the plaintiff resulting in injury to him. It will be
noticed that the defendant in that case was not a manufacturer;
committed no act but simply failed to do something. Also it will
be noted that the petition alleged the breach of contract as con-
stituting the wrong. This doctrine was expanded to include all
Supra note 126.
Us Supra note 32.
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acts of negligence committed by a manufacturer winch resulted
in injury to a user other than the immediate purchaser from the
manufacturer. As a practical matter the injury never occurs
to the immediate vendee of the manufacturer. Because of our
business practice the manufacturer always sells to a wholesaler,
jobber, or retailer, who in turn sells to the consumer. The con-
sumer, is in the overwhelming majority of cases the one who
suffers the injury The harshness of the rule was at once real-
ized in Thomas v Winchester when poison was mislabeled and
sold. We then invented the "dangerous instrument" doctrine.
This doctrine has been expanded to cover the widest range of
subjects. There is no consistency in the decisions of the courts
in holding what constitutes an inherently dangerous instrument.
Harsh and unfair decisions result from cases m wich the manu-
facturer was unquestionably at fault. There is no test of, or any
way to tell when an instrument is inherently dangerous. It is
unnecessary to inquire into this question, since the ordinary
rules of determining liability in negligence cases are adequate
to protect the manufacturer. One should be held responsible
for any injury which is the natural and probable result of his
wrongful act and which could have been foreseen by a reason-
able and prudent man in his position.
